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Unsettled: How Climate Change Challenges a
Foundation of Our Legal System, and Adapting the
Legal State
Victor B. Flatt*
One of the fundamental goals of law is to end disputes. This push
to “settlement” is foundational and has historically worked to increase
societal efficiency and justice by engendering legitimate expectations
among the citizenry. However, the efficient nature of much legal
finality, settlement and repose only exists against a background of
evolution of the physical environment that is predictable and slowpaced. That background no longer exists. The alteration of the
physical world, and thus, the background for our societal structure
and decisions, is accelerating rapidly due to human-caused climate
change. This creates a mismatch between the law’s tendency to finality
and repose and the now fast-changing nature of the real world. This
Article proposes that law’s repose must be re-examined if we are to
have any hopes of societal efficiency moving forward. In order to do
this, however, this Article posits that we need to understand the law’s
tendency to finality and preserve this to the extent that it is still
necessary and useful, while re-examining the parts of static law that
are most impacted by the changing physical world.
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“How does one reconcile the need for a stable legislation that
stands “in radical contradiction with the pluralism and
dynamism of life-as-becoming”? 1
I. INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM OF CERTAINTY IN AN
UNCERTAIN WORLD
One of the fundamental goals of law and legal regimes is to
provide certainty: “The norms of the legal system establish
authoritatively enforced rights and duties, set the terms of social
cooperation, and engender legitimate expectations among citizens.”2
The importance of certainty is reflected in the law’s push for settled
rights. Reflecting on Hume and Bentham, Dan Tarlock states that
“[o]nce a decision is rendered, we expect parties to abide permanently
by the outcome.” 3 However, in our current changing climate, even
the proximate future is no longer predictable, and this requires a
rethinking of law’s default to finality and repose. Some final legal
settlements, whether in litigation or regulation, must be revisited.
Climate change is altering our background circumstances and will
continue to do so in ways that undermine the assumptions that led to
the evolution of finality or settled rights in the legal system.
While criminal law and most private law (especially as it pertains
to private law disputes) still benefit tremendously from the values of
finality, the same is not true of the law governing many forms of
private property, especially real estate, water rights, and rights to use
public lands. 4 On the public law side, the changing physical
background not only affects environmental and natural resources law,
but also areas of law such as immigration, trade, banking,
and insurance.
The Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA) provides an
illustrative example of the issue. Congress passed the CZMA in 1972

1. Herman W. Siemens, Nietzsche and the Temporality of (Self-)Legislation, in
NIETZSCHE ON TIME AND HISTORY 191 (Manuel Dries ed., 2008).
2. Gregory C. Keating, Fidelity to Pre-existing Law and the Legitimacy of Legal Decision,
69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 4 (1993).
3. A. Dan Tarlock, Environmental Law: Ethics or Science?, 7 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y
F. 193, 206 (1996).
4. See, e.g., Lara D. Guercio, Climate Change Adaptation and Coastal Property Rights:
A Massachusetts Case Study, 40 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 349, 350 (2013).
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to mitigate coastal environmental destruction from human activity. 5
Under the CZMA, coastal states are charged with creating coastal
zone management plans that identify land uses, critical coastal areas,
management measures, and other details on how the states plan to
protect their coastal regions. 6 The CZMA is administered by the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) in the
Department of Commerce. 7
Coastal zones in the United States are among the areas most
affected by climate change. 8 NOAA has recognized this reality by
classifying climate change as a force that affects sea level, intensity of
storms, rainfall variability, oceanic acidification, and water
temperature. 9 Congress amended the CZMA in 2012 specifically to
require coastal states to consider the impact of climate change as they
developed new state coastal zone management plans. 10 This
amendment should have pushed each state to revise its coastal zone
management plans to reflect this, but most coastal states have not. 11
This failure arises mainly because the CZMA has no legal mechanism
to require a state to change its plan once NOAA accepts the original
plan. 12 “Whatever authority NOAA may have to impose
implementation requirements . . . it may not revisit the question of

5. 16 U.S.C. § 1451 (2012).
6. 16 U.S.C. § 1455(b), (d) (2012).
7. 15 C.F.R. § 923.1(a) (2015); 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451–1455 (2012).
8. U.S. GLOB. CHANGE RES. PROGRAM, CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS IN THE UNITED
STATES: NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT 580 (Jerry M. Melillo et al. eds., 2014),
http://nca2014.globalchange.gov/report/regions/coasts. “The combined effects of climate
changes with other human-induced stresses makes predicting the effects of climate change on
coastal systems challenging. However, it is certain that these factors will create increasing hazards
to the coasts’ densely populated areas.” Id. at 582.
9. NOAA OFFICE OF OCEAN & COASTAL RES. MGMT., ADAPTING TO CLIMATE
CHANGE: A PLANNING GUIDE FOR STATE COASTAL MANAGERS 28 (2010),
http://coastalmanagement.noaa.gov/climate/docs/adaptationguide.pdf.
10. 16 U.S.C. § 1451(l) (2012) (“Because global warming may result in a substantial sea
level rise with serious adverse effects in the coastal zone, coastal states must anticipate and plan
for such an occurrence.”).
11. See Office for Coastal Management, Coastal Management Programs, NAT’L OCEANIC
& ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., https://coast.noaa.gov/czm/mystate/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2016)
(demonstrating that of the thirty-five states and territories that currently have coastal zone
management authority, arguably only California, Delaware, New York, Rhode Island, and
Virginia have taken action that could be construed as incorporating the considering of climate
change on the state’s coastal zone into their official coastal zone management plan).
12. Cal. By Cal. Coastal Comm’n v. Mack, 693 F. Supp. 821, 825 (N.D. Cal. 1988).
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the program’s adequacy.” 13 While the NOAA has regulations for
“continuing review” of coastal zone plans, these reviews concern only
whether or not the state has followed its original, existing plan. 14 NOAA
may suspend financial assistance if a state fails to follow its approved
coastal plan. 15 However, “NOAA does not have authority to revisit the
approvability of a plan . . . . [O]nce NOAA determines that a program
satisfies the requirements of the CZMA and grants final approval, it may
no longer examine the content of the approved program . . . .”16 Only
the states can initiate the process to change a plan. 17
This perverse result—which prevents the federal government from
requiring states to take climate change, or, indeed, any new natural
physical impacts into account in a coastal plan—is a direct consequence
of the assumption of a static physical environment that prevailed at the
time the CZMA was created. As explained in California Coastal
Commission v. Mack, the main concern after initial approval of a plan is
that a state can depend on having a “settled” plan. 18
In this Article, I will explore the nature of finality and settled rights
in our legal system and how this normative background, properly
understood, must be altered to accommodate the massive changes
occurring in our world from climate disruption. Part II explores the
evolution of law, and its embrace of finality and settled rights. It also
recognizes the existence of legal dynamism in certain areas of law. Part
III then takes this current framework and explores why it fails to
recognize or accommodate unplanned, rapid change in the physical
world. Part IV looks at possible responses, including a review of prior
scholarship recognizing that a changing climate challenges the legal
system. It then notes how previous work collectively fails to fully
address the normative framework underlying law’s push toward
finality and resulting ill-fit with the new world norm. Part V explains
how recognition of these issues is the most important step for change
and then explores additional legal tools that might help, ending with
a proposed statutory framework. Part VI concludes.

13. Id. at 826.
14. 15 C.F.R. §§ 923.132(a), 923.133(a) (2015).
15. 16 U.S.C. § 1458(c)(1) (2012).
16. Cal. By Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 693 F. Supp. at 825.
17. Id. (holding that a statutory change in 1986 does allow NOAA to condition state
funding on protection of certain coastal resources); see also 16 U.S.C. § 1458(c) (2012).
18. Id.
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II. SETTLED LAW BASED ON A STABLE WORLD
The fact that a law designed to deal with the needs of the physical
area (the coastal zone) most susceptible to climate change impacts
does not have the capacity to alter settled legal rights and
responsibilities is not surprising when one recognizes the power of our
legal system’s push towards settled rights. The legal default to, and
preference for certainty, finality, and settled rights, is seen in the basic
common laws of torts (laches doctrine), 19 contracts (rules governing
when cases can be brought upon breach), 20 and property (adverse
possession),21 as well as procedural aspects of the common law system,
such as exhaustion.22 Statutorily, we have statutes of limitation and
statutes of repose. 23 This push toward finality has evolved in the common
law over centuries and has been adopted as a normative underpinning in
law generally, including statutory and administrative law. 24
Some reasons for legal finality are obvious: requiring quick, settled
legal resolution can avoid evidentiary staleness 25 and avoid prejudice
(as seen in the evidentiary rules). 26 Moreover, settled rights and
responsibilities have been considered critical for a legal system to
function efficiently 27 as evidenced by statutes of limitation and statutes
of repose. “Statutes of limitation[] ‘promote justice by preventing
surprises through [the] revival of claims that have been allowed to
19. 19 AM. JUR. 2D Equity § 108 (1939) (explaining the foundation of laches). Laches is
a common law doctrine that requires cases to be brought in a certain time period, so that legal
status will not be continually subject to changes wrought by new lawsuits.
20. Laseter v. Pet Dairy Prods. Co., 246 F.2d 747, 750 (4th Cir. 1957) (failing to find
breach of an employment contract for lack of definiteness); see also RICHARD A. LORD, 1
WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 4:21 (4th ed. 2016). Subsequent or different agreements should
not change settled contract unless it meets specific rules and requirements.
21. Jeffrey Evans Stake, The Uneasy Case for Adverse Possession, 89 GEO. L.J. 2419, 2441
(2000–2001). Adverse possession allows parties creating economic wealth from property the
certainty of settled ownership doctrine if disputes later erupt.
22. Exhaustion of remedies, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (7th ed. 1999).
23. Jill E. Evans, See Repose Run: Setting the Boundaries of the Rule of Repose in
Environmental Trespass and Nuisance Cases, 38 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 119,
132–33 (2013–2014).
24. See, e.g., United States v. Sanchez-Cervantes, 282 F.3d 664, 667 (9th Cir. 2002)
(noting that rules against retroactive application of laws serve the interest of finality in law).
25. Stake, supra note 21, at 2438.
26. Jessica L. West, Is Injustice Relevant? Narrative and Blameworthiness in Protester
Trials, 86 TEMP. L. REV. 107, 122 (2013–2014).
27. Keating, supra note 2, at 4.
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slumber until evidence has been lost . . . .” 28 Statutes of repose go even
further, supporting fresh starts as a social goal, by deciding “there
should be a specific time beyond which a defendant should no longer
be subjected to protracted liability.” 29
But to fully understand the impact of a mismatch between a system
prone to settled answers and an unsettled world, we need to explore
the why of finality and settlement more comprehensively. How do the
normative reasons for settled outcomes relate to the other normative
underpinnings of law? And, most importantly, can we preserve the
normative functions of settled doctrine 30 while accommodating the
mismatch between finality and a changed and fast-changing world?
A. The Purpose of Laws, Finality, and Settlement
The concept of law and the purpose of laws has evolved and grown
in complexity from the ancient view of law as a device to keep the
peace to the modern idea that law balances equity, due process, and
economics. 31 The evolution of laws can be viewed as a progression of
phases that add to and modify the legal system. These phases add new
ideas about the purpose of law and make legal systems more complex.
In seeking to determine the state of legal justice as it related to ideas
of social and economic justice, Harvard Law School Dean and
influential legal scholar Roscoe Pound attempted to create a coherent
understanding of this evolution in the early part of the twentieth
century. He addressed the relationship between the origins of law and
emerging doctrines in the American legal system. 32 His explanation of

28. CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 134 S. Ct. 2175, 2183 (2014) (quoting Order of R.R.
Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 348–49 (1944)).
29. Id. (quoting Sch. Bd. of Norfolk v. United States Gypsum Co., 360 S.E.2d 325, 328
(Va. 1987)).
30. Throughout the Article, I use the term “settled doctrine” to refer to legal rules that
appear to be static.
31. John Cirace, When Are Law and Economics Isomorphic?, 39 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV.
183, 220 (2008–2009) (suggesting that legal rationality—based on traditional legal concepts
including due process and equity—and economic rationality are separate but coequal rational
processes that can be brought to bear when examining legal questions); John C. Gardner, The
Origin of Law, 49 JURID. REV. 329, 332 (1937) (“Although law is a social growth and a social
necessity, that does not mean that it is unrelated to moral as well as to economic forces.”).
32. Roscoe Pound, The End of Law as Developed in Legal Rules and Doctrines, 27 HARV.
L. REV. 195 (1914).
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law’s evolution demonstrates that settlement and finality have been
important since the beginning of the concept of law. 33
The earliest origins of the settled doctrine came from the push to
resolve disputes peacefully and avoid ongoing bloodshed, 34 which
could be a drain to the population as a whole. In ancient, stateless
societies, one mode of redress prior to law was self-help; if a person
were offended or harmed by someone, he or she could retaliate
directly. 35 This mode of redress often led to ongoing feuds between
kindred groups. 36 Thus, primitive laws sought to codify the regulation
of self-help and revenge. 37 Consequently, law emerged as a tool to
“avert private vengeance and prevent private war []as an instrument
of justice” 38 and substitute those feuds with a peaceful device for
redress. The prevailing social interest at the time was the general
security of a community, and law contributed to this by providing the
means for peaceful resolution of disputes. 39
As societies and states grew more complex, human interaction
became more common, as did as the need for regulation of those
interactions. In the classical society of Rome, for example, most
disputes were taken to the state for resolution. The fear of arbitrary
decision-making prompted a rigid system characterized by strict
application of decisional rules. 40 In a time when disputes could end in
the spilling of blood, the formal procedure provided by these strict
laws offered a general notion of security, certainty, and uniformity. 41
In other words, Roman systems reflected the principle that Pound
observed centuries later: “The chief end which the legal system seeks
is certainty.” 42 This claim for certainty found root in the formality of

33. See id. at 203 (discussing that, in ancient law, “[m]odes of trial are not rational but
mechanical, since the end is to reach a peaceable solution, not to determine the
truth exactly . . . .”).
34. Id. at 198–99.
35. Id. at 199; James Q. Whitman, At the Origins of Law and the State: Supervision of
Violence, Mutilation of Bodies, or Setting of Prices?, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 41, 42, 46 (1995).
36. Pound, supra note 32, at 199.
37. See, e.g., Whitman, supra note 35, at 46.
38. See Pound, supra note 32, at 199.
39. Id. at 204.
40. Roscoe Pound, The End of Law as Developed in Legal Rules and Doctrines, 27 HARV.
L. REV. 195, 204 (1915).
41. Pound, supra note 32, at 204, 208–09, 213.
42. Id. at 204.
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procedure and pleading. 43 Formal doctrine could remove the
unpredictability and arbitrariness of decision outcomes, though strict
adherence to the letter and form of law often led to harsh and
sometimes unjust outcomes. 44
Over time, the perceived need for justice led to further
developments in legal doctrines and the adoption of natural law
theories of equity in both ancient Rome and in English common law. 45
These same Roman ideals later influenced the American legal system. 46
Natural law theories incorporated ideas from Greek philosophers, such
as Plato and Aristotle, 47 and grounded outcomes and laws in morality
and justice. 48 Natural law’s purpose thus ostensibly supports the
common good of the community and the development of law to
reflect recognized moral obligations. 49 The aims of natural law were
“reduced by Justinian in a famous passage to three maxims: ‘to live
honestly, to hurt no one, to give every one his due.’” 50
These theories were embraced by early Christian philosophers
such as St. Thomas Aquinas and other influential advocates of natural
law. 51 Thus, strains of natural law grounded in Christian legal theory
have had a strong influence on the development of American law. 52
While natural law brought the concepts of equity and justice to our
43. Id. at 205.
44. Id. (“[I]n Greek law if a plaintiff sued for twenty minae and could prove only eighteen
due, the issue being whether twenty were due, a verdict for the defendant was required.”).
45. Id. at 213.
46. See Amir Aaron Kakan, Evolution of American Law, from its Roman Origin to the
Present, ORANGE COUNTY LAW., Feb. 2006, at 31–46.
47. See Ricardo Gosalbo-Bono, The Significance of the Rule of Law and Its Implications
for the European Union and the United States, 72 U. PITT. L. REV. 229, 233 (2010). But see John
R. Kroger, The Philosophical Foundations of Roman Law: Aristotle, The Stoics, and Roman
Theories of Natural Law, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 905, 916 (2004).
48. See Pound, supra note 32, at 213.
49. See Gosalbo-Bono, supra note 47, at 233; Pound, supra note 32, at 220.
50. Richard A. Epstein, From Natural Law to Social Welfare: Theoretical Principles and
Practical Applications, 100 IOWA L. REV. 1743, 1745 (2015) (quoting JUSTINIAN, INSTITUTES
1.1.3 (J.B. Moyle trans., 1911)).
51. Natural Law for Today’s Lawyer, 9 STAN. L. REV. 455, 459 (1957) [hereinafter
Natural Law]; see Matthew D. Wright, The Aim of Law and the Nature of Political Community:
An Assessment of Finnis on Aquinas, AM. J. JURIS. 133–34 (2009); Thomas Aquinas: Political
Philosophy, INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, http://www.iep.utm.edu/aquipol/#H1 (last visited Oct. 18, 2016).
52. See Natural Law, supra note 51, at 495 (“Historically, natural law has played an
important part in the development of our jurisprudence and of our case law.”).
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concept of the role of law, it did not diminish the need or importance
of certainty. As Pound noted, “In order to insure equality, the maturity
of law again insists strongly upon certainty . . . .” 53
Modern theories of law, such as positivism, realism, and formalism,
can be seen as evolutions of, or reactions to, the emergence of natural
law. These legal theories promote their own justification for laws.
Some are reactions against natural law; for example, positivism
purports to separate morals from law. 54 Others, such as formalism and
realism, have developed at odds with one another. 55
Much of today’s legal preference for settlement can be traced to
the importance of predictability in formalism. Predictability in the
application and operation of legal doctrine promotes a perception of
fairness among the citizenry. “Formalism holds that ‘legal reasoning
should [and thus can] determine all specific actions required by the
law based only on objective facts, unambiguous rules, and logic.’”56
In other words, judges are, “and should be[,] tightly constrained by
the objectively determinable meaning of a statute . . .” 57 Formalists
believed that law “should be[] unresponsive to factual contexts and
circumstances” and based on principles indifferent to the changing
needs of society and the social purposes that law may serve. 58 These
principles center on certainty and the protection of the community by
separating the rule of law from arbitrariness. 59
In contrast, legal realism posits that “judges react primarily to the
underlying facts of the case, rather than to applicable legal rules and
reasons.” 60 Under realism, the purpose of law is the realization of
53. Pound, supra note 32, at 221.
54. But see Charles L. Barzun, The Forgotten Foundations of Hart and Sacks, 99 VA. L.
REV. 1, 27–29 (2013) (discussing scholarly views on positivism and its association with morality).
55. See Brian Leiter, Positivism, Formalism, Realism, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1138, 1147 n.30
SEBOK,
LEGAL
POSITIVISM
IN
AMERICAN
(1999)
(reviewing
ANTHONY
JURISPRUDENCE (1998)).
56. Id. at 1144 (alteration in original) (quoting STEVEN J. BURTON, AN INTRODUCTION
TO LAW AND LEGAL REASONING 3 (2d ed. 1995)).
57. Id. at 1144 (quoting William Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV.
621, 646 (1990)).
58. Gerald B. Wetlaufer, Systems of Belief in Modern American Law: A View from Century’s
End, 49 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 12 (1999).
59. But see Shawn J. Bayern, Against Certainty, 41 HOFSTRA L. REV. 53, 84–86 (2012)
(arguing that viewing formalism as a protection against arbitrary government may be
overly simplistic).
60. Leiter, supra note 55, at 1148.
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“articulated social policies,” and “questions of law should be resolved
with a view to the social consequences that would flow from a
particular ruling.” 61 Though perhaps not as tethered to “certainty” as
formalism, legal realism’s preoccupation with just outcomes also
envisions a kind of formal endpoint.
Law is never completely static, however; the very evolution of law
attests to this. 62 Moreover, the common law has always accommodated
changes. But these changes occur at a pace that in general does not
harm the benefits of stability. In a recent defense of the importance
of common law, Balganesh and Parchomovsky state that the very
essence of the common law’s survival is its ability to balance the
competing forces of “stability and change.” 63 Thus, while legal
changes occur slowly in the common law, the common law has still
been able to accommodate evolving social values. 64 Accepting that
societal values and systems are interwoven with the physical
environment, discussed earlier, this kind of evolution that does exist
in law is mismatched with the current realities occurring in the
physical world.
In addition to this slow evolution that still accommodates the
values of stability and predictability, law has also seen accelerated
change that can disrupt stability and reliance if driven by “progress.”
Separating the normal legal evolution that seeks to preserve stability
and predictability from this separate strand of legal change is
important to understanding the role of stability in law. In the latter
half of the twentieth century, Professor Robert Gordon lumped all of
the historic episodes of legal evolution under the term “adaptation”
theory, which sought to explain the need for stability and
predictability with changing circumstances. He felt it was the examples
of legal change that could explain commonalities across many of the
different legal theories. 65

61. Marcus J. Curtis, Realism Revisited: Reaffirming the Centrality of the New Deal in
Realist Jurisprudence, 27 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 157, 164 (2015).
62. See discussion infra Section II.A.
63. Shyamkrishna Balganesh & Gideon Parchomovsky, Structure and Value in the
Common Law, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1241, 1243–44 (2015).
64. See id. at 1247.
65. Robert W. Gordon, Historicism in Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1017, 1036 (1981).
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I have given a lot of attention to adaptation theory because under
one name or another—expediency, convenience, utility, growth,
development,
modernization,
historical
or
sociological
jurisprudence, the functional approach, social engineering, policy
analysis, efficiency, or responsive law—it has been a component of
virtually all the major movements of Anglo-American juristic writing,
and has been a common element cutting across otherwise violent
controversies between schools. 66

Based on this perspective of law, Gordon argues that the purpose
of law is to realize in society that certain norms are tied to a notion of
historical development, either gradually realizing themselves in history
or evolving into their current norms from past, inferior ones. 67 In that
view, constancy and dynamism both support the purpose of law. He
also states that legal science is “related to something more
fundamental than mere politics: to principles of fundamental right as
realized teleologically through historical experience and, even more
important, to needs spontaneously emerging from social life and to
the long-term logic of historical development.” 68
It is not surprising that climate change has resurrected the term
“adaptation” to underscore the need for change to accommodate a
different physical world. What can adaptation mean, however, when
we apply it to law itself?
B. Certainty and Dynamism in Law
While the desire for certainty is important to the nature of our law
generally, 69 this concept of settled decisions supposes that those areas
of the law with repose are themselves unchanging. Against such
unchanging backgrounds, law must respect settled doctrine and
legitimate expectations. 70 For example, a quiet title action assumes that
a property line is fixed, and rules governing exposure levels to toxins
assume that human response to certain exposures is unchanging.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1040.
69. See infra Section II.A.
70. This forms the reasoning underlying the majority opinion in the famous Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992), even though it is arguable that the opinion
itself ignored the extent to which actual changes had occurred to the background environment
that could have elicited an altered legal doctrine.
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However, as recognized by Gordon, such repose and settlement
in law is not uniform. Law is not always unchanging and settled.
Certainty is notably absent in legal areas in which underlying change
is expected, recognized, and accommodated. Since the industrial
revolution, dynamism has found a way to trump stare decisis when
necessary in common law tort evolution. 71 Regarding the supposed
definitive nature of per se negligence when a statute is violated, New
York’s highest court noted how newly enacted legislation to
accommodate the growing use of motor vehicles would not be
construed “to be charged with negligence as [a] matter of law for
acting as prudence dictates.” 72 The famous case of The T.J. Hooper
holds that custom should not be controlling in negligence cases when
“a whole calling may have unduly lagged in the adoption of new and
available devices.” 73
Of course, contract law has always allowed for consideration of
changed circumstance when such is anticipated by the parties. In
certain areas, such as agreements concerning technology, the law
recognizes the pace and scope of underlying change and allows for
some dynamism in legal governance. 74 Private ordering can also allow
flexibility without need of repose in disparate areas of the law, 75 which
would allow dynamic adjustment to changed circumstances.
The acceleration of the statutory and administrative state can itself
be seen as law adjusting itself to changed circumstances. Again, in
areas in which change is common and expected, such as from
technology or economic policy, our legislatures routinely intervene to
alter prior statutes or the common law to address these changes. A
recent example is the passage of the Cybersecurity Information
Sharing Act of 2015, enacted on December 18, 2015. 76 The bill was
passed in response to concerns about the ability of hackers to engage
71. See e.g., The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2nd Cir. 1932).
72. Tedla v. Ellman, 19 N.E.2d 987, 989 (N.Y. 1939).
73. The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d at 740.
74. See John F. Coyle & Joseph M. Green, Contractual Innovation in Venture Capital,
66 HASTINGS L.J. 133, 160–71 (2014) (detailing a variety of convertible notes arising from
technological advances).
75. See, e.g., RETHINKING COMMODIFICATION: CASES AND READINGS IN LAW AND
CULTURE 9 (Martha M. Ertman & Joan C. Williams eds., 2005) (demonstrating that private
ordering and markets continue to be “discovered” in new areas).
76. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, H.R. 2029, 114th Cong. (2015) (The
Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015 was amended into the spending bill).
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in cyber-attacks, a relatively new national security threat brought on
by changes to information technology. 77 Though the pace of statutory
reaction to technological innovations may not be suitably quick for all
of us, there is legal response to rapid technological change through
both common law and statutory change. 78
Contrast this with the opening discussion of the Coastal Zone
Management Act. It seems that the law can respond quickly to rapid
changes in the technological and market field, but not in areas in
which the physical world is undergoing rapid change. This suggests
that legal dynamism is associated only with those worlds in which
purposeful change is understood.
C. Legal Constancy and Dynamism as Both Supporting Efficiency
As described above, our law contains features that allow for rapid
evolution when technological and economic advances result in
changed circumstances. While the normative reasons for such
apparent flexibility may not always be fully articulated, I believe they
are based on the understanding that technological and economic
advances adopted by society create a changed efficiency equation.
Laws and rules that worked with prior technology or economic
systems may no longer be efficient or appropriate. 79
Our understanding of the interaction between legal standards and
technological change in fact goes all the way back to our constitutional
protections for inventors. The patent system was designed to create an
economic incentive to invent beneficial devices by providing a legal
monopoly on its sale for a time, but not to stifle innovation on new

77. See Frederick Ding, Senate passes Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act, HARV. J.L.
& TECH.: JOLT DIG. (Nov. 18, 2015), http://jolt.law.harvard.edu/digest/legislation/senatepasses-cybersecurity-information-sharing-act.
78. Other recent examples include new regulations of drones and state laws regarding
gathering information of employee social media accounts. See Access to Social Media Usernames
and Passwords, NAT’L CONF. STATE LEGS. (July 6, 2016), http://www.ncsl.org/
research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/employer-access-to-social-mediapasswords-2013.aspx; Bart Jansen, FAA unveils drone rules; Obama orders policy for agencies,
U.S.A. TODAY (Feb. 16, 2015, 8:12 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/
2015/02/15/faa-drone-rule/23440469/.
79. Michael Pappas argues how conceptualizing environmental and resources laws as
“anti-waste” is a superior method for understanding these laws because it allows for flexibility in
application to preserve efficiency. Michael Pappas, Anti-Waste, 56 ARIZ. L. REV. 741, 788–
89 (2014).

1410

1.FLATT.FIN3.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1397

1/26/2017 1:27 PM

Unsettled: How Climate Change Challenges a Foundation

ideas completely, by withdrawing the patent protection after this
set time. 80
Michael Pappas notes how property law evolved quite quickly
when necessary to capture efficiencies. 81 The evolution of personhood
and human rights in law—though occurring more slowly than legal
recognition of technological change—can also be understood in terms
of economic efficiency: “Although consistent protections for bodily
integrity arose somewhat later [in law] than did widespread
conceptions of property, they are similar in that they arose in
connection with opportunities for greater wealth production for
society as a whole. . . .” 82
As set out in The T.J. Hooper, this means that if custom lags what
is reasonable as determined by probability of harm, the defendant
should not disregard prudence, even if not general practice. 83 Modern
statutes likewise reflect the understanding that technological
innovation at times requires that legal parameters be reset. In the
environmental law realm, for instance, the Clean Air Act (CAA) and
the Clean Water Act (CWA) both require the EPA to revisit what
constitutes the “best” pollution control technology at regular
intervals. 84 If “best technology” were static, this requirement would
not be necessary.
As discussed, below, the link between staticism and efficiency has
also been cited in the law and climate change literature. 85 In critiquing
the use of conservation easements, Jessica Owley uses efficiency as a
standard to judge whether these legal doctrines should be amended.86
Her theory is that underlying changes in the world have rendered or
could render the conservation easements inefficient in a societal

80. See Benjamin N. Roin, The Case for Tailoring Patent Awards Based on Time-to-Market,
61 UCLA L. REV. 672, 677 (2014); see also Stephen S. Mosher, Best Idea Ever, 77 TEX. B.J.
448 (2014).
81. Pappas, supra note 79, at 772–74.
82. Victor B. Flatt, This Land is Your Land (Our Right to the Environment), 107 W. VA.
L. REV. 1, 17 (2004).
83. The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2nd Cir. 1932).
84. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b) (2012); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §
7411(a)(1) (2012).
85. See infra Section IV.A.
86. Jessica Owley, Changing Property in a Changing World: A Call for the End of Perpetual
Conservation Easements, 30 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 121, 144–45 (2011).
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sense. 87 As this example illustrates, efficiency is an important
consideration in determining whether and how law should evolve.
III. RECOGNITION OF A CHANGING PHYSICAL WORLD IS A NEW
PHENOMENON; THERE EXISTS NO LEGAL HISTORY OR THEORY TO
ACCOMMODATE SUCH CHANGE
Given the fact that certain areas of law respond to change
dynamically, why has evolution lagged in the legal structures that
govern the physical world and is the subject of such accelerated
change? The reason is both philosophical and practical, and both of
these must be addressed to facilitate a move away from “settled”
legal doctrine.
A. Western Religious and Philosophic Thought Embrace an
Unchanging World
Though much of common and statutory law, including
environmental law, recognizes and acknowledges that technological
and scientific innovations should be accommodated in law, the
recognition of a changing world is philosophically suspect to a large
cohort of Western society. In Western culture, from the creation of a
static earth in Genesis through the settled stories of mythology, the
creation was something that had happened and was not ongoing; the
world was stable. 88 And for much of human history, nothing
challenged this discourse. It was not until the theory of evolution—
which was not fully embraced by science until the late nineteenth
century—that a background norm of change was even recognized by
a small part of Western culture. 89
As might be expected, the conflict over the concept of a changing
world also has a spiritual component. Even today, many religious
persons question the scientific validity of evolution based on the
assumption that it is incompatible with the Judeo-Christian teachings

87. Id.
88. See generally Plato, Cratylus, in THE COLLECTED DIALOGS OF PLATO: INCLUDING
THE LETTERS 421 (Edith Hamilton & Huntington Cairns eds., 1961); CATECHISM OF THE
CATHOLIC
CHURCH
art.
1:66,
http://www.vatican.va/archive/ccc_css/
archive/catechism/p1s1c2a1.htm (last visited Sept. 9, 2016).
89. H. Wayne House, Darwinism and the Law: Can Non-Naturalistic Scientific Theories
Survive Constitutional Challenge? 13 REGENT U. L. REV. 355, 355–57 (2000).
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of the “Creation,” and thus the story of God’s relationship with
humanity. 90 This is not based just on the creation story, but also on
the conception of God’s relationship with the world. 91 The early
Christian church decided that God’s covenant through Christ’s
sacrifice was a singular, unrepeatable event. 92 According to Catechism
of the Catholic Church, a central tenet of Christianity is that all of
God’s mystery has been revealed and that there will be no new
revelations forthcoming. 93 This religious argument has also been put
forth to argue against the existence of harmful climate change. 94
Our environmental law, resource use, property ownership, and
policies governing development in the physical world themselves
adopt this dominant Western philosophy. The transcendental
movement, which underlies modern environmentalism, sought to
preserve the static, even from technical innovation. 95 This was based
on solely the spiritual notion that the unaltered natural world was
somehow holy. 96 Writing a century later, Aldo Leopold stated that “a
thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and
beauty of the biotic community.” 97 Such a worldview is deeply
embedded in human thought. As noted by evolutionary biologists,
such core worldview beliefs are not necessarily rational and not
necessarily responsive to reasoned argument. 98 Therefore, we have a

90. Susan Haack, Cracks in the Wall, A Bulge Under the Carpet: The Singular Story of
Religion, Evolution, and the U.S. Constitution, 57 WAYNE L. REV. 1303, 1331 (2011).
91. See, e.g., Casey Luskin, Zeal for Darwin’s House Consumes Them: How Supporters of
Evolution Encourage Violations of the Establishment Clause, 3 LIBERTY U. L. REV. 403,
445 (2009).
92. Hebrews 10:1–18 (The New Revised Standard Version Catholic Edition:
Anglicized Text).
93. See CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, supra note 88.
94. Inhofe: It is ‘Arrogance of People to Think That We . . . Would be Able to Change’ What
(Mar.
12, 2012),
God is Doing with the Climate, THINK PROGRESS
http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2012/03/12/442584/inhofe-arrogance-people-changegod-climate/.
95. Victor B. Flatt, The Human Environment of the Mind: Correcting NEPA
Implementation by Treating Environmental Philosophy and Environmental Risk Allocation as
Environmental Values Under NEPA, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 85, 98 (1994).
96. Id.
97. ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC: WITH ESSAYS ON CONSERVATION
FROM ROUND RIVER 262 (1966).
98. See Shi-Ling Hsu, The Accidental Postmodernists: A New Era of Skepticism in
Environmental Policy, 39 VT. L. REV. 27, 55 (2014) (discussing how “people do not naturally
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philosophical worldview deeply entwined with permanence and
stability, which is continually reinforced by our experiences and
supposed objective observations.
Our laws naturally reflect that worldview.
Thus, our entire legislative and regulatory infrastructure
concerning the physical world is based on the concept that the world’s
natural background has a static setting, and that perturbations to this
setting are in fact unnatural and should be corrected to such extent as
necessary to return to the norm. 99 For example, the Endangered
Species Act takes the pre-modern mix of species and natural
ecosystems as the goal for action under that statute. 100 The concept of
a static physical background is also present in the Stafford Act, 101 the
Marine Mammal Protection Act, 102 Wilderness Act, 103 Monuments
Act, 104 Native American Grave Protection and Repatriation Act
(NAGPRA), 105 and the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA).106
Federal courts have declared that National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA) does not apply to “federal actions that merely maintain[] the
status quo” or the “routine maintenance of an ongoing, pre-NEPA

employ reason to reach a conclusion, but they overwhelmingly tend to have an emotive reaction
and subsequently come up with a rationalization to support it.”).
99. See generally Todd S. Aagaard, Environmental Harms, Use Conflicts, and Neutral
Baselines in Environmental Law, 60 DUKE L.J. 1505, 1515–17 (2011) (demonstrating that
“natural” baselines are prevalent in the discussion of environmental law, even though this creates
a normative assumption); J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Gaming the Past: The Theory and Practice
of Historic Baselines in the Administrative State, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1, 14, 21 (2011) (“[H]istoric
baselines [are thought to] return things to a prior state of health.”).
100. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6) (2012) (designating a species as endangered when in danger of
extinction throughout all or a portion of its historic range).
101. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121–5122 (1994) (declaring a need for special measures to protect
human health amid major natural disasters disrupting the normal functioning of governments
and communities).
102. 16 U.S.C. § 1386(a)(2)–(3) (2012) (directing the Secretary to conduct species stock
assessments based on current population trends and to note any decline or departure from the
existing stock baseline).
103. 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c) (2012) (preserving federal wilderness land, defined by its natural
and primeval conditions “untrammeled by man”).
104. 16 U.S.C. § 433(h) (2012) (authorizing the Secretary of the Interior to accept
donated land for preservation and then to fix its boundaries).
105. 25 U.S.C. § 3002(a)(2)(C) (2012) (establishing an ownership standard favorable to
the historical, aboriginal inhabitants of an area).
106. 54 U.S.C. § 100101(a), (b)(1)(C) (2014) (directing the National Park Service to
preserve areas recognized for “superb environmental quality”).
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project,” 107 implicitly endorsing the idea that once something is in
place, it does not change. 108
Similarly, common law and prior agreements over water tend to
assume a static baseline that—as shown below—is inconsistent with
modern reality. 109 These static legal doctrines are enforced by litigation
or regulatory action. For example, in Norton v. Southern Utah
Wilderness Alliance, the Supreme Court held that NEPA is not
triggered by changing circumstances unless another “ongoing major
Federal action” is to occur. 110 All of these areas involve the physical
world as a background, and all assume an unchanging background.
B. Until Recently, the Physical Environment has been “Unchanging”
Outside of Planned Human Activity
The belief in a static background also has a practical component.
Natural processes have historically occurred so slowly that they
generally do not register on human consciousness. To the extent that
most major geologic changes occur over longer spans than human
history, the physical shell of our world for all practical purposes has
been historically unchanging. 111 And, even though we accept the
theory of evolution, natural evolution without human pressure has
primarily occurred over longer time spans than human attention.112
Since it is costly to always reanalyze relationships in law, if the physical
world, for all practical purposes, is unchanging, then why expend
107. Wild Fish Conservancy v. Kempthorne, 613 F. Supp. 2d. 1209, 1210, 1218 (E.D.
Wash. 2009) (rev’d on other grounds sub nom); see also Wild Fish Conservancy v. Salazar, 628
F.3d 513, 523 (9th Cir. 2010).
108. See e.g., Bob Egelko, Editorial, Judge dismisses most of a suit against EPA pesticide
approvals, SFGATE (Aug. 15, 2014, 8:42 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/science/article/Judgedismisses-most-of-a-suit-against-EPA-5689391.php (exemplifying the final nature of
administrative decisions in a ruling on pesticide approvals under TSCA, wherein the magistrate
held tightly to a 60 day deadline to challenge with an extension possible only “if . . . issues that
couldn’t have been foreseen earlier”).
109. Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, Adaptive Water Law, 62 U. KAN. L. REV. 1043, 1043–
49 (2014).
110. 542 U.S. 55, 73 (2004) (discussing whether the Utah Bureau of Land Management
failed to adequately protect Utah public lands from damage caused by off-road vehicles).
111. See e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Uncertainty, 99 GEO. L.J. 901, 941 (2011).
112. See generally Susan Emmenegger & Axel Tschentscher, Taking Nature’s Rights
Seriously: The Long Way to Biocentrism in Environmental Law, 6 GEO. INT’L. ENVTL. L. REV.
545, 580 n.202 (1994) (discussing how human intervention negatively impacts the extremely
slow process of natural selection).
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resources to confirm the obvious? Our common law is much older
than the theory of evolution, and few people would normally see
noticeable changes in any species within one human lifetime.113
Because humans don’t witness evolutionary change in their lifetimes,
there is not a large incentive for adopting a legal system that can adapt
to that change. If one assumes an Unchanging background, efficiency
would be best served by not revisiting background considerations with
respect to new decision making. 114
At one time this assumption of a static or slowly changing
background might have made practical sense; today, the underlying
assumption of a static background is clearly untrue. Thus, it is
maladaptive from an efficiency point of view. In 2014, Science
reported that “present extinction rates are likely a thousand times
higher than the background rate.” 115 “[T]he Earth has entered a new
period of extinction,” with vertebrates “disappearing at a rate 114
times faster than normal,” declares a study examining climate change,
pollution, and deforestation conducted at Princeton, Berkeley, and
Stanford. 116 While the background world has always changed, “historic
changes in the climate and sea levels occurred at much slower rates
and absent built environments that restrict species’ movements.”117
Thus, while law is not strictly static, it has historically changed so
slowly in most circumstances to be practically unchanging. Human
intervention, primarily in the form of climate change, alters that
calculation. “Although humanity is generating and accruing
information of its own design at an exponential rate, human activity is
destroying biological information at a pace that qualifies our time as
113. Id. at 580 n.202 (quoting CHARLES DARWIN, ON THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES BY MEANS
NATURAL SELECTION 153 (J.W. Burrow ed., England, Penguin Books 1968)) (“Nothing
can be effected, unless favorable variations occur, and variation itself is apparently always a very
slow process.”).
114. Law, of course, does change and evolve, but outside of purposeful change, it has
historically done so at a slow pace not generally recognized at a social scale. See ERIC T.
FREYFOGLE, ON PRIVATE PROPERTY: FINDING COMMON GROUND ON THE OWNERSHIP OF
LAND xiv–xv (2007) (providing a critique of the perception of unchanging property law).
115. S. L. Pimm et. al., The biodiversity of species and their rates of extinction, distribution,
and protection, 344 SCIENCE, May 30, 2014, at 1246752-1, 1246752-2,
http://www.sciencemag.org/content/344/6187/1246752.full.
116. Sci. & Env’t, Earth ‘entering new extinction phase’- US study, BBC NEWS (June 20,
2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-33209548.
117. Jaclyn Lopez, Biodiversity on the Brink: The Role of “Assisted Migration” in Managing
Endangered Species Threatened with Rising Seas, 39 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 157, 162 (2015).
OF
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one of the great extinction spasms in geological history.” 118 This
destruction and rapid change will most likely accelerate in the
future. 119 While most humans may not have witnessed species evolve,
they have seen multiple species become extinct since the passage of
the Endangered Species Act. 120
Most legal scholars, especially those that write about the
environment and natural resources, now recognize that the physical
world is not a static environment and that dynamism and
unpredictability will become more commonplace as climate change
accelerates. 121 This makes some current laws outdated. As Robin Craig
writes, “[E]xisting environmental and natural resources laws are
preservationist, grounded in the old stationarity framework that no
longer reflects ecological realities.” 122 Add to this all other law
concerning or based on any part of our physical world, and the scale
of the mismatch between laws and the things law governs becomes
crystal clear. The very notion of climate change must alter our
worldview, and thus, our view of governance. 123
C. Administrative Law Reflects this Dominant View that Law
Changes Only to Accommodate Planned or Expected Change
What may seem puzzling is why administrative law is not equipped
to handle such changing circumstances. After all, isn’t one of the
benefits of the administrative law structure that it allows for quick
incorporation of new information? In one of the first cases involving
118. Jim Chen, Webs of Life: Biodiversity Conservation as a Species of Information Policy, 89
IOWA L. REV. 495, 501 (2004).
119. See, e.g., Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC], Summary for
Policymakers, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY 1, 12–
25 (C.B. Field et al. eds., 2014), http://ipcc-wg2.gov/AR5/images/uploads/
WG2AR5_SPM_FINAL.pdf.
120. See generally John Buse, A Different Perspective on the Endangered Species Act at 40:
Responding to Damien M. Schiff, 38 ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. & POL’Y J. 145, 153–56, 154 n.61
(2014) (detailing the increased rates of extinction over the last decades).
121. Cf. Arnold, supra note 109, at 1048 (asserting that current regulations “based on
average conditions . . . at a fixed point in time” may be inadequate to address the extremes
expected with climate change).
122. Robin Kundis Craig, “Stationarity is Dead” — Long Live Transformation: Five
Principles for Climate Change Adaptation Law, 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 9, 17 (2010).
123. Cf. id. at 30 (“[C]limate change adaptation law will often require both a new way of
thinking about what regulation is supposed to accomplish and different kinds of legal
frameworks for accomplishing those new goals.”).
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the modern administrative state, the D.C. Circuit stated that “[o]ne
of the purposes of administrative law is to permit a more elastic and
informal procedure than is possible before our more formal courts.”124
Although administrative law is often premised and justified on the
notion of flexibility, historically, this flexibility was bounded and
balanced with consistency and finality to promote the legitimacy of
administrative actions. 125
Most formal administrative action, from rulemaking to
adjudication, initiates only after a stasis has been reached. Requests
must be clear, evidence must be ready, and proposals must have taken
on a final form. Before agency action can be reviewed, it must have
reached a form of stasis through finality and ripeness. 126 The settled
doctrine of rulemaking forbids challenges to agency action when an
issue was not raised at an early stage. 127 Even more insidiously, the very
notion of administrative rulemaking is premised on the idea that it is
efficient because it minimizes the individuation necessary when the
application of unchanging background materials to new facts. 128 As
Professors Craig and Ruhl note, “[A]dministrative law drives agencies
toward finality,” 129 or, stated more prosaically, “[A]gencies . . .
steamroll their decisions through public-comment scrutiny and
judicial review litigation and then never look back.” 130 As noted by
Professor Daniel Farber, an “unspoken assumption of administrative
law” is that it is “defined by discrete ‘final and binding action[s].’”131
Camacho and Glicksman similarly assert that certainty is a basic legal

124. Lambros v. Young, 145 F.2d. 341, 343 (D.C. Cir. 1944).
125. See generally Mark Fenster, The Birth of a “Logical System”: Thurman Arnold and the
Making of Modern Administrative Law, 84 OR. L. REV. 69, 73–75 (2005); Aaron L. Nielsen,
Visualizing Change in Administrative Law, 49 GA. L. REV. 757, 772–76 (2015).
126. William Funk, A Primer on Nonlegislative Rules, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 1321, 1335–41
(2001); see also Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177–78 (1997); Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387
U.S. 136, 149–51 (1967).
127. See Egelko, supra note 108.
128. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV.
L. REV. 22, 63 (1992).
129. Robin Kundis Craig & J.B. Ruhl, Designing Administrative Law for Adaptive
Management, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1, 36 (2014).
130. Id. at 5.
131. See Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Lost World of Administrative
Law, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1137, 1150 (2014).
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premise of administrative regulation even as they argue for more
“adaptive administrative regulation.” 132
Though statutes may legally allow agencies more flexibility,
agencies have failed to use this flexibility to account for changed
background circumstances. 133 Despite beliefs to the contrary, much of
administrative law change comes from political considerations, rather
than from changes in circumstances 134. Petitions for new agency action
can be—and sometimes are—proposed because of “changed
circumstances,” but such petitioning is driven by a push for policy
change based on changed political circumstances rather than factual
circumstances. 135 Though policy flexibility has been critiqued for
undercutting certainty and reliance on policy decisions, 136 the ability
of agencies to change policies or interpretations, even for political
reasons, has been well established since Chevron. 137 There is thus an
interplay between administrative flexibility and the need for
policy finality.
As discussed above, aside from statutory reauthorizations and
sunset provisions, our laws and their administrative implementation
are designed with consistency and settlement in mind. Decisions may
be made by the agency, but the agency is allowed only to “fill [in] the
gaps,” 138 not alter the trajectory based on changed circumstances in
most cases. While some forms of finality, such as certain statute of
limitation rules and rulemaking procedures, may seem necessary to
avoid a situation in which policy choice questions are reconsidered or

132. See Alejandro E. Camacho & Robert L. Glicksman, Legal Adaptive Capacity: How
Program Goals and Processes Shape Federal Land Adaptation to Climate Change, 87 U. COLO.
L. REV. 711 (2015).
133. See Victor B. Flatt & Jeremy M. Tarr, Adaptation, Legal Resiliency, and the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers: Managing Water Supply in a Climate-Altered World, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1499,
1501 (2011).
134. Farber, supra note 131, at 1168–69.
135. Id.
136. See Jonathan Masur, Judicial Deference and the Credibility of Agency Commitments,
60 VAND. L. REV. 1021, 1023 (2007).
137. See Russell L. Weaver, A Foolish Consistency is the Hobgoblin of Little Minds, 44 BAYLOR
L. REV. 529, 542–43 (1992) (“Agencies themselves are free to change their own interpretations
provided that they give a reasoned explanation for the change.”).
138. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 847 (1984).
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re-litigated forever, they were never predicated on the need to stymie
changes when the background facts themselves change. 139
The literature critiquing the flexibility of agency policy provides
the theoretical case for why agency action should tend towards settled
doctrine. Clear and consistent legal decisions can increase economic
efficiency. 140 Absent a purposeful human change to the world, whether
through technology or changing social norms or expectations,
revisiting prior decisions against an unchanging background would
either 1) simply lead to the same result and would thus be inefficient
to undertake, or 2) lead to a markedly different set of regulatory
requirements because of policy preferences in the executive branch,
undermining business and societal expectations. However, this
assumption only makes sense in a static physical environment.
Considering that laws have evolved and been created with an
understanding of a static physical world, the lack of agency
responsiveness to a changing background—even when agency
flexibility is statutorily authorized through enabling legislation—is no
surprise. 141 The rare case in which administrative inertia overcomes its
default stationarity is the exception that proves the rule. Because it is
so unusual, the Bureau of Offshore Energy Management’s (“BOEM”)
2014 proposal to revisit financial responsibility regulation for offshore
oil platform decommissioning is instructive. 142 Offshore oil drilling has
changed drastically in the last twenty-five years, with drilling occurring

139. Masur, supra note 136, at 1023–24 (suggesting that such was never planned because
it was never anticipated).
140. Id.
141. The theoretical and Constitutional underpinnings of administrative law would also
provide some limit to agency flexibility to respond to completely unexpected circumstances.
Though ignored by the majority of the Supreme Court today, complete unbounded flexibility
could raise issues with the non-delegation doctrine, were the laws to allow agency flexibility in
any truly unpredictable circumstance. Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1057 (D.C.
Cir. 1999), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom by Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S.
457, 485–86 (2001); Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(“These cases bring into bold relief the scope of the potentially unconstitutional delegations we
have come to countenance in the name of Chevron deference.”).
142. Risk Management, Financial Assurance, and Loss Prevention, 79 Fed. Reg. 160,
49027-31 (Aug. 19, 2014); Phil Taylor, “E&E: Interior to Update Decades-old Bonding Regs,”
E&E REP. (Aug. 18, 2014), http://www.reefrelieffounders.com/drilling/2014/08/19/eeinterior-to-update-decades-old-bonding-regs/.
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in deeper and deeper waters. 143 The BOEM rules have required these
rigs to have financial stability in case something goes wrong. 144 Given
the large change in the actual operation, size and complexity of
offshore drilling rigs, this suggests that the rules written for financial
responsibility for decommissioning these much larger rigs should
change. However, this proposed change did not occur until after the
Macondo Well explosion brought focus to problems with outdated
rules in offshore oil drilling. 145 Without this attention and the Mineral
Management Service re-organization to BOEM, the rules regarding
financial responsibility likely would have remained static. Agencies
tend not to revisit prior determinations without attention and
pressure, no matter how much the facts on the ground have changed.
There have been attempts to litigate to force administrative
agencies to take changed circumstances into account, as seen in two
recent climate adaptation-related complaints. One, United States v.
Miami-Dade County, alleges that a proposed consent decree will
violate the Clean Water Act (CWA) as the climate changes, and thus
must be altered. 146 Another, Conservation Law Foundation v. Jackson,
also under the CWA, alleges that water quality planning from 1978
must be revisited to consider the changes to water quality that can be
expected as a result of climate change. 147 As noted by Hari Osofsky
and Jacqueline Peel, such cases illustrate that without litigation,
government agencies will not undertake examination of climate
change impacts in planning and infrastructure contexts, even when the
changed environment would suggest the necessity of such

143. Victor B. Flatt, The “Worst Case” May be the Best: Rethinking NEPA Law to Avoid
Future Environmental Disasters, 6 ENVT’L. & ENERGY L. & POL’Y J. 181, 195 (2011).
144. Jennifer A. Dlouhy, “Obama Administration Plan Would Ensure Energy Companies
(Sept.
22,
2015),
Pay
to
Scrap
Old
Offshore
Hulks,”
FUELFIX
http://fuelfix.com/blog/2015/09/22/new-white-house-rule-would-ensure-energycompanies-pay-to-scrap-old-offshore-hulks/#29976101=0 (“Existing financial assurance
regulations and guidelines need an update to better reflect the “realities” of offshore energy
development, which include aging infrastructure and increasing decommissioning costs, [BOEM
Director Abigail] Hopper said.”).
145. Hari M. Osofsky, Multidimensional Governance and the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil
Spill, 63 FLA. L. REV. 1077, 1123 (2011).
146. Complaint in Intervention at 7, United States. v. Miami-Dade County, No. 1224400-FAM (S.D. Fla. June 25, 2013).
147. First Amended Complaint at 1, Conservation Law Found., Inc. v. Jackson, No. 11cv-11657 (D. Mass. Sept. 10, 2012).
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consideration. 148 Unfortunately, preparing for all eventualities, even if
they could be predicted, is not an answer. As Osofsky notes in her
analysis of the Deepwater Horizon tragedy, complex problems are not
necessarily
solved
by
more
complicated
regulatory
management schemes. 149
IV. ADDRESSING THE DEFAULT TO SETTLEMENT IN LAW
A. Legal Flexibility or Adaptive Capacity Alone is Not the Answer
Recognition of the problems with staticism in the law is not
completely new. Scholars and scientists have identified this issue in the
ESA and other resource laws for several years. 150 Craig and Ruhl
describe the general mismatch between ecological “restoration” and the
idea that restoration must hearken back to a prior natural state.151
Jessica Owley has critiqued the use of permanent conservation
easements for failing to recognize changing circumstances. 152 Some
scholars have proposed “adaptive management” as a tool to recognize
changing circumstances and new information in the regulatory
context. 153 For the most part, this criticism has tended to focus on the
impact of a changing climate on resource management. 154 But a

148. Jacqueline Peel & Hari M. Osofsky, Sue to Adapt?, 99 MINN. L. REV. 2177 (2014).
149. Osofsky, supra note 145, at 1099–100.
150. Alejandro E. Camacho, Assisted Migration: Redefining Nature and Natural Resource
Law Under Climate Change, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 171, 174–75 (2010); J.B. Ruhl, Climate
Change and the Endangered Species Act: Building Bridges to the No-Analog Future, 88 B.U. L.
REV. 1 (2008); Niina Heikkinen, “Will it be Extinction or “Translocation” as Impacts of Climate
Change Increase?”, CLIMATEWIRE (Aug. 15, 2014), http://www.eenews.net/
climatewire/stories/1060004459.
151. Margaret A. Palmer & J.B. Ruhl, Aligning Restoration Science and the Law to Sustain
Ecological Infrastructure for the Future, FRONTIERS ECOLOGY ENV’T, Nov. 1, 2015, at 512–19.
152. Owley, supra note 86.
153. Craig & Ruhl, supra note 129, at 9 (citations omitted) (“[T]he adaptive management
trial has only recently begun, and it is moving slowly with mixed results. Putting adaptive
management into practice has proven far more difficult has proven far more difficult than its
early theorists expected.”). Some laws do anticipate changing circumstances and recognize that
allocation decisions or scientific studies may need to be revisited. These include the federal
planning laws in FLPMA and the NFMA, which require re-analysis of long-term goals at certain
intervals, and the Clean Air Act, which anticipates further scientific discoveries concerning the
impact of air pollutants on human health and the environment. 42 U.S.C. §
7409(d)(2)(B) (2012).
154. See articles cited supra note 150.
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changing climate’s impacts go beyond natural resources as our entire
social and legal system is predicated on our physical environment. 155
Some recent literature has tried to square a static legal and
regulatory system with a rapidly changing world. 156 Holly Doremus
explores whether the common law of property can “evolve” when
pressured by a fast changing world. 157 Other literature has proposed
procedural flexibility 158 and examining and changing underlying
statutes to support substantive flexibility. 159 For instance, Donald
Hornstein, 160 Alejandro Camacho, 161 and J.B. Ruhl 162 each have looked
at the importance of “resilience” in administrative law. Hornstein has
examined whether “adaptive” administrative structures can improve
outcomes in complex systems. 163
Craig and Ruhl take the call for adaptive management in the face
of climate change a step further by proposing that administrative law
generally be changed to make adaptive management more effective
155. See Victor B. Flatt, Adapting Laws for a Changing World: A Systemic Approach to
Climate Change Adaptation, 64 FLA. L. REV. 269, 273 (2012).
156. Alejandro E. Camacho, Adapting Governance to Climate Change: Managing
Uncertainty Through a Learning Infrastructure, 59 EMORY L.J. 1, 36–40 (2009); Alejandro E.
Camacho, Can Regulation Evolve? Lessons from a Study in Maladaptive Management, 55 UCLA
L. REV. 293, 331, 349–51 (2007); Camacho & Glicksman, supra note 132, at 713–14 (citing
Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1, 21–
22 (1997)); Craig & Ruhl, supra note 129; Holly Doremus, Adaptive Management as an
Information Problem, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1455 (2011); Robert L. Glicksman & Sidney A. Shapiro,
Improving Regulation Through Incremental Adjustment, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 1179 (2004);
Donald T. Hornstein, Complexity Theory, Adaptation, and Administrative Law, 54 DUKE L.J.
913 (2005); Richard J. Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change: Restraining the
Present to Liberate the Future, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1153, 1156–57 (2009); J.B. Ruhl & James
Salzman, Climate Change, Dead Zones, and Massive Problems in the Administrative State: A
Guide for Whittling Away, 98 CAL. L. REV. 59, 97–98 (2010).
157. Holly Doremus, Climate Change and the Evolution of Property Rights, 1 U.C. IRVINE
L. REV. 1091 (2011). Eric Freyfogle notes that the common law of property has evolved, but
not on a time scale that evolution is commonly recognized. See FREYFOGLE, supra note 114,
at xv.
158. Cf. Craig & Ruhl, supra note 129, at 46 (arguing for the need to abandon finality for
periodic agency reassessment).
159. Camacho & Glicksman, supra note 132, at 713.
160. Donald T. Hornstein, Resiliency, Adaptation, and the Upsides of Ex Post Lawmaking,
89 N.C. L. REV. 1551, 1553 (2010).
161. Alejandro E. Camacho, Transforming the Means and Ends of Natural Resources
Management, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1405, 1411 (2010).
162. J.B. Ruhl, General Design Principles for Resilience and Adaptive Capacity in Legal
Systems – With Applications to Climate Change Adaptation, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1373 (2010).
163. Hornstein, supra note 160.
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while still allowing for the oversight of agency discretion. 164 They
suggest that a certain track of administrative law be altered to allow
for flexible rulemaking and enforcement in areas where physical facts
are changing quickly. 165 This is a step toward recognition of the
conflict between legal finality and changing circumstances, yet it is
suggested for a limited arena in resource laws in which administrative
agencies are given more decision-making authority. Specifically, the
proposal does not address the more fundamental problem of the
embedded finality in law generally that hampers society’s ability to
adapt to changing circumstances.
Hannah Wiseman has discussed the problem of agency staticism
with respect to scale. 166 Once rules are made, she writes, the agency
has no incentive to revisit them even though the problems that the
rules originally addressed may have changed in scale so much that
another response is required. 167 Though both of these scholarly tracks
identify the problem of static legal mechanism, the solutions they
propose are not grounded in a normative idea of why or when agencies
should undergo review of settled doctrine.
At an earlier time, and in a general critique of the administrative
process, Jody Freeman hoped that collaborative governance could
introduce standards that change as needed, instead of introducing one
time, final decisions. 168 In their analysis of federal resource
management agencies and their statutory power, Camacho and
Glicksman note that substantive as well as procedural law may need to
be changed in order to accommodate flexibility. 169 However, even in
those cases in which substantive flexibility is allowed in an authorizing
statute, such variation was meant for only limited parameters. Though
changing the substance of a law to add adaptive capacity could allow a
broad flexible regulatory response to physical changes underlying
settled decisions, exercise of the authority to alter the substantive
impact of a law has not occurred on a large scale. 170 That our laws are
164. Craig & Ruhl, supra note 129, at 40–49.
165. Id. at 19.
166. Hannah Wiseman, Remedying Regulatory Diseconomies of Scale, 94 B.U. L. REV. 235,
238–39 (2014).
167. Id. at 236–39.
168. Freeman, supra note 156, at 7–8.
169. Camacho & Glicksman, supra note 132, at 716.
170. See e.g., id. at 718; Flatt & Tarr, supra note 133, at 1500.
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currently in this state is not surprising when we juxtapose the seeming
flexibility against the primary tendency in the law towards finality
and consistency. 171
The resource adaptation literature thus explores and explains
many potential legal fixes to address the mismatch between
stationarity and dynamism. Yet, outside of particular laws, none of the
literature has examined the fundamental bias towards stationarity
within the legal and regulatory systems. Aside from proposals seeking
to apply adaptive management theories from the resource context to
the regulatory context, 172 the centrality of dynamism from climate
change in opposition to the static nature of law itself has yet to be
addressed as a conflict for our legal system generally.
Given climate change’s effects on our legal and social systems, 173
we cannot adapt without recognizing and replacing our default push
for settlement in law. Outside of the private law context in which
parties can agree for mutually beneficial change of legal governance,
legal adaptive capacity in common law or statutes depends on judicial,
legislative, or regulatory evolution to initiate flexibility. This will not
prove sufficient for the big picture. The focus on flexibility in climate
change adaptation in law may be helpful but does not address whether
the physical facts underlying the assumptions of so many prior rules
and decisions have changed so that the rules and decisions require reexamination. 174 What really should be examined is the notion of
“settlement,” 175 even when background circumstances have changed
and will continue changing.
This does not mean the concept of settled doctrine should be
consigned to the garbage heap. It serves important functions in the
legal system. 176 However, finding a way for legislatures, administrative
agencies, and the judicial branch to recognize that changed
171. See discussion supra Part I.
172. Craig & Ruhl, supra note 129, at 19 (suggesting a new “adaptive management track”
to allow agency flexibility where necessary to accommodate changing circumstances. They
propose this specifically for dynamic systems in which uncertainty and controllability are high,
but risk is low.).
173. Flatt, supra note 155, at 273.
174. Arnold, supra note 109, at 1054 (acknowledging the static nature of water law, but
proposing flexibility as an adaptive solution going forward).
175. See discussion supra Section II.B.
176. The necessity of settled doctrine and how “settled” it should be and has been explored
in multiple fora. See, e.g., Carol Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577,
592–93 (1988); Sullivan, supra note 128.
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circumstances require a re-examination of decisions is critically
important if we are to accommodate our changed world.
B. Alternatives to Unsettle the Law
Flexibility alone will not make our laws more responsive to
changed circumstances. The scholarly work about systemic changes in
a regulatory system and possibilities of common law change are on the
right track. But it is not enough. Inefficient repose and settlement in
public law requires addressing both the underlying impacts of
inappropriate settled doctrines or decisions and why the law itself has
not already responded. As discussed, the preference for settled
doctrine has historically been efficient for changes outside of human
will, and philosophical and religious beliefs have intertwined to
mutually reinforce this historically efficient state of human society. 177
I do not propose to change human nature, philosophy, or religion,
but I do believe that if we as a society and country recognize the
importance of avoiding legal calcification in the face of an
unprecedented rate of physical change in our world, it is possible to
bring to bear recognized legal tools to the job. Two solutions that
have an effect of avoiding legal permanency include sunset provisions
for most statutes and ad hoc legal and regulatory work-arounds when
necessary to make a situation more economically efficient or to
accomplish other agreed upon principles. I examine the functionality
of both of these in this situation.
1. Can we wait for ad hoc solutions when evidence demonstrates a
misfit between law and the climate-altered world?
Work-arounds for a climate change world have been attempted—
as would be expected when the legal system does not work efficiently.
Even so, they have not proven themselves particularly effective.
Because the normative baseline is finality, ad hoc attempts to infuse
flexibility into the legal system seem to fail. Though there may be
some legal “reset,” the broader system always drifts back to the finality
default for the reasons we have discussed. 178 An illustrative example
comes from legal responses and approaches to flood control. The last
ten years have demonstrated the enormous economic impact of a fast

177. See supra Sections III.A–B.
178. See infra Section II.A.
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changing and unpredictable physical environment, while also
demonstrating how difficult it has been to try and correct the
economic losses, based in part on a legal system that is mal-adaptive
to the new reality.
Many devastating floods hit the United States in the early part of
the twentieth century causing great loss of life and property. 179 In an
effort to reduce such flooding, the federal government began many
construction projects to control floodwaters on the riverine systems,
though such flooding was known to be variable. 180 However, federal
government agencies believed that this variability had predictable
parameters—such as the 100-year flood plain or 500-year flood
plain—and focused on protecting these areas to control flooding.181
Once the flood protections were in place, authorities allowed
development to occur in these former floodplains. 182 The development
was later assisted by the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP),
which would provide government sponsored flood insurance in those
areas deemed to be safe from flooding based on government
protection and known flood parameters. 183
The failures of the NFIP and related flood programs in the past
decade shows the difficulty of using ad hoc fixes. 184 The NFIP
remained fairly solvent until 2005, but with the unprecedented
hurricane season of that year, it became insolvent. 185 This insolvency
has continued to increase, reaching twenty-four billion dollars by
2013. 186 While the impacts of Hurricane Katrina show the most vivid
example of loss of life and property, it is the increase in total quantity
and scope of these events that demonstrates the real misfit between

179. Christine Klein & Sandra Zellmer, Mississippi River Stories: Lessons from a Century of
Unnatural Disasters, 60 S.M.U. L. REV. 1471, 1480 (2007) (explaining rapid development put
more people and settlement in floodplains).
180. Id. at 1485.
181. Daniel McCool, The River Commons: A New Era in U.S. Water Policy, 83 TEX. L.
REV. 1903, 1904–05 (2005).
182. Klein & Zellmer, supra note 179, at 1486.
183. Id. at 1491.
184. Id. at 1533.
185. Carolyn Kousky & Howard Kunreuther, Issue Brief: Addressing Affordability in the
National Flood Insurance Program, RES. FOR THE FUTURE & THE WHARTON RISK MGMT.
DECISION PROCESSES CTR. 1 (Aug. 2013), http://www.rff.org/files/sharepoint/
WorkImages/Download/RFF-IB-13-02.pdf.
186. Id.
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the legal regime designed to protect and compensate against flooding
and the major losses that have occurred. The last decade has seen
multiple precipitation events wholly outside the realm of historic
memory. These include: the Iowa floods of 2008, 187 the Nashville
flood of 2010, 188 the Vermont flooding of 2011, 189 the South Carolina
flooding of 2015, 190 and the Baton Rouge flooding in 2016. 191 In each
of these cases, massive precipitation, outside of the historic norm,
overwhelmed federally designed protections for flood control along
river systems. Additionally, Hurricane Katrina and Superstorm Sandy
had the first and second highest property losses ever incurred
from flooding. 192
The payout from disasters has swelled. As noted above, in 2004,
the federal flood insurance system was solvent. 193 By 2013, it owed
twenty-four billion dollars to the federal treasury, putting the solvency
of the program at risk. 194 Much of this cost could have been avoided
with a changed and better-designed legal system. It is very clear that
certain mitigation actions taken before recent weather events would
have greatly reduced the total loss incurred. 195 However, the legal
187. WEATHER & FORECAST OFFICE – DES MOINES, IOWA, NAT’L WEATHER SERV.,
CENTRAL IOWA FLOODS OF 2008, LOCAL OFFICE SERVICE ASSESSMENT (2009),
www.crh.noaa.gov/images/dmx/2008Flood,NSWDesMoines_2008_Flood_Assessment_publi
cPDF.pdf (“This service assessment focuses on the historic flooding in central Iowa from late
May 2008 through June 2008.”).
188. May 1&2 2010 Epic Flood Event for Western and Middle Tennessee, NAT’L WEATHER
SERV. (May 18, 2010), http://www.srh.noaa.gov/ohx?n=may2010epicfloodevent.
189. See Kousky & Kunreuther, supra note 185; see also Irene Leaves Vermont with “Epic”
Flooding, CBS NEWS (Aug. 29, 2011, 11:05 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/ireneleaves-vermont-with-epic-flooding/.
190. CAROLINAS INTEGRATED SCI. & ASSESSMENTS, THE SOUTH CAROLINA FLOODS OF
OCTOBER 2015 (Oct. 30, 2015), http://www.cisa.sc.edu/PDFs/October%202015%2
0Flood%20Event%204%20Pager.pdf.
191. Camille Robertson & Alan Binder, As Louisiana Floodwaters Recede, the Scope of
Disaster Comes into View, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 16, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/
2016/08/17/us/louisiana-flooding.html?_r=0.
192. RAWLE O. KING, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42850, THE NATIONAL FLOOD
INSURANCE PROGRAM: STATUS AND REMAINING ISSUES FOR CONGRESS (Feb. 6, 2013),
http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42850.pdf.
193. See discussion supra Section IV.B.1
194. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-15-290, HIGH RISK: NATIONAL FLOOD
INSURANCE PROGRAM (2015), http://www.gao.gov/highrisk/national_flood_insurance/
why_did_study.
195. See KING, supra note 192, at 5 (noting that every dollar of hazard mitigation spent
saves five dollars in disaster costs).
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system regulating floods, set up decades earlier, incentivized increased
economic losses, by paying for harm, but not preventing it. In 2014,
this led to an outlay for flood damages, and thus for climate change
impacts, from the federal government of over sixty-five
billion dollars. 196
In the face of such enormous loss and inefficiency, one would
expect to see attempted work-arounds by both government and the
private sector. One proposed government work-around was to allow
recovery money to rebuild in areas further from harm’s way. 197 While
this has not occurred as formal policy, post-Sandy guidance does allow
money for buyouts of damaged locations and encourages structures to
be rebuilt with more resilient features. 198 After the staggering costs and
NFIP losses of Superstorm Sandy, Congress amended the whole
statutory strategy to make insurance premiums more accurately reflect
the risk of the climate-altered world, particularly in coastal areas. 199
However, after public outcry, this amendment to the Federal Flood
Insurance Program was amended in a new bill to slow the adjustment
of premium increases and incentivize better hazard mitigation. 200 The
financial incentives to change the policy on government insurance in
the face of changed circumstances were certainly real, and were acted
upon, but even in this case, it proved difficult to change policy because
of existing interests. Thus, even ad hoc attempts to amend laws in the
face of a changing physical background face resistance from inertia and
parties who might lose entrenched economic benefits. 201

196. Doyle Rice, Hurricane Sandy, Drought Cost U.S. $100 billion, USA TODAY (Jan. 25,
2013, 8:34 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/weather/2013/01/24/global-disasterreport-sandy-drought/1862201/.
197. See KING, supra note 192, at 4.
198. Ben Jervey, Year After Sandy, Rebuilding for Storms and Rising Seas, NAT’L
GEOGRAPHIC (Oct. 22, 2013), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2013/10/
131026-hurricane-sandy-anniversary-sea-level-rise-adaptation/.
199. KING, supra note 192, at 8.
200. Deborah Barfield Berry & Ledyard King, House Passes Flood Insurance Bill, USA
TODAY (Mar. 4, 2014, 7:55 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/
2014/03/04/house-passes-flood-insurance-bill/6037775/;
see
Biggert-Waters
Flood
Insurance Reform Act of 2012, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4001–4130 (2012).
201. A similar dynamic is at play in state regulation of insurance, wherein the state
subsidizes risk that is increasing due to climate change. Brittany Patterson, Insurance Debate
Flares as Climate Change Boosts Wildfire Risk, CLIMATEWIRE (Jan. 28, 2016),
http://www.eenews.net/stories/1060031287.
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2. Sunset provisions
Sunset provisions, which require laws to be reauthorized after a
certain time period, seem to be one way of forcing consideration of
laws at regular intervals. This might allow the legal response to match
the state of the physical world. Our current model of sunset provisions
in law, however, is ill-suited to this paradigm. Sunset provisions often
come about as a political compromise to which both sides may hope
to enhance or jettison at the time of sunset. 202 Thus, rather than
providing a clean slate for reconsidering changed circumstances,
sunset provisions currently do little more than provide new
opportunities for lobbying and revisiting policy. 203 Similarly, sunset
provisions have been used to impact budget projections by taking laws
off the books at some future time to limit fiscal impacts even if most
legislators might intend or plan to continue the policy into
the future. 204
Historic use of sunset provisions is based on anticipation of policy
changes or trade-offs, which undermines the core reasons for certainty
and settlement in law. 205 Such provisions create economic uncertainties
and inefficiencies—such as costs associated with again passing laws—
while not necessarily allowing for changes in law to better mirror
unexpected changes in the physical world. 206 Expiring tax credits for
renewable energy at the federal level illustrate the potential and
problem of using sunset provisions to update legal systems.
Tax credits for renewable energy started with bipartisan support
in 1992. 207 Over time, these renewable energy tax credits were subject
to multiple sunset provisions in 1999, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2007, 2009,

202. Paul Ohm, The Argument Against Technology-Neutral Surveillance Laws, 88 TEX. L.
REV. 1685, 1710–11 (2010).
203. See Erin Dewey, Sundown and You Better Take Care: Why Sunset Provisions Harm the
Renewable Energy Industry and Violate Tax Principles, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1105, 1120–21 (2011).
204. Id. at 1121; cf. Bruce R. Huber, The Durability of Private Claims to Public Property,
102 GEO. L.J. 991, 994 (2014) (examining how temporary government grants of property
interest create permanent expectations).
205. See discussion supra Section II.C.
206. See Ohm, supra note 202, at 1711, 1712.
207. See Dewey, supra note 203, at 1115.
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2013, 2014, and 2020. 208 Unlike many sunset provisions, one
explanation of sun-setting renewable energy tax breaks relates to
expected changes in future costs of technology. In this way, sunset
provisions could be a tool for updating law as expectations in cost
structure in the future may be different, but there is uncertainty to
how different. But in truth, the many sunset provisions in this arena
suggest that the real reason for the sunset provisions were that neither
side could get energy policy to reflect its views entirely, so trade-offs
in the form of sunset provisions were made. 209
Even assuming that the sunset provisions were originally put in
place because of uncertainty over the future state of technology and
development, the subsequent history of tax credit extensions
illustrates a profound disagreement over the role of government in
supporting renewable energy—a policy dispute—rather than any
attempt to fit law to economic change. 210
Thus, while sunset provisions could theoretically support
flexibility, in practice they have been used to keep policy options open
rather than to allow the law to respond to changing circumstances.
V. WHAT TO DO
Law tends towards staticism. There are many reasons for this, but
those reasons could still be supported while recognizing that changing
circumstances in the physical world ask us to re-evaluate laws stasis.
What then is the solution? It must both grow out of the recognition
of the need to shift the paradigm from legal permanency and an
agreement to do so. Proposals from the legal literature recognizing
the need for legal flexibility will not be sufficient. The first part of the
solution is for society to recognize the fundamental problem now
lying at the heart of our legal system.
The Supreme Court’s holding that the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA) does not cover changed circumstances without
“actions” shows how oblivious our statutes and court interpretations

208. Id. at 1127–28; Cassandra Sweet, Wind, Solar Companies Get Boost From Tax-Credit
Extension, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 16, 2015, 7:18 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/wind-solarcompanies-get-boost-from-tax-credit-extension-1450311501.
209. See Dewey, supra note 203, at 1141–42 (pointing out the PTC has been amended
“seven times in the past fifteen years”).
210. See Melissa Powers, Sustainable Energy Subsidies, 43 ENVTL. L. 211, 226–27 (2013).
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are to both the fact that an altered background can change the
efficiency of settled rights and the static fallback of our legal system.211
Given the slow pace of common law evolution to background physical
changes—as opposed to policy or technical advancements—directed
change will likely require legislative action. 212 Over the last several
decades, our legislatures have intervened more and more in altering
common law schemes, and replacing them with statutory and
administrative schemes. 213
Within statutory schemes we have examples of new (often
administrative) actions based on particular timing or triggering
devices. Resource planning laws, such as the Federal Land Planning
and Management Act and the National Forest Management Act, allow
changes through planning periods, 214 and certain pollution laws
assume that pollution sources should be re-permitted. 215 Notice-andcomment during the re-examining or re-permitting process, and if
necessary, subsequent litigation, could provide the necessary
mechanisms to consider the changed background. The
aforementioned statutes were designed to allow alteration for updated
scientific knowledge or policy changes. 216 Therefore, provisions
requiring periodic administrative action could be used to incorporate
climate change and altered physical realities into new situations
without necessarily using re-visitation and flexibility solely to
unsettle policy.
Because of the base assumption of the unchanging physical
backdrop, many laws have no substantive mechanism that would allow
such a re-examination or provide a way to petition for one. For
instance, as noted in the introduction, the CZMA, a law obviously
impacted by climate change, does not have codified rules or any

211. Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness All., 542 U.S. 55, 73 (2004).
212. Unlike sunset provisions, a general law requiring periodic analysis of programs would
not necessarily invite rent-seeking and lobbying. When changes are necessary due to climatealtered backgrounds, such input is justified.
213. See Vincent R. Johnson, On Race, Gender, and Radical Tort Reform: A Review of
Martha Chamallas & Jennifer B. Wriggins, The Measure of Injury: Race, Gender, and Tort Law,
17 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 591, 605–06 (2011).
214. 16 U.S.C. § 1604 (2012); 43 U.S.C. § 1712 (2012).
215. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(1)(B) (2012); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §
7661(a)(b)(5)(B) (2012).
216. 16 U.S.C. § 1604 (2012); 43 U.S.C. § 1712 (2012).
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mechanism governing revisions. 217 The example of the CZMA
demonstrates that, absent specific provisions, regulatory statutes do
not update automatically. These specific provisions are available in
limited circumstances in the CWA, 218 the CAA, 219 and major federal
planning laws, but not in the CZMA, 220 the NHPA, 221 or NAGPRA,222
to name a few. In these cases, a necessary first step that Camacho and
Glicksman call for is the substantive authority to allow for adaptation
to occur. 223
Beyond the need for substantive authority, some mechanism
would need to require the re-visitation of settled doctrine. Such
changes on a statute-by-statute basis are unlikely. 224 A better option
might be a statute of general applicability that provides government
authorities the ability to make changes based on climate impacts. 225
This statute should also require that agencies periodically re-examine
their programs and policies—not individual decisions—and make
recommendations concerning areas that would be affected by climate
change. 226 A comprehensive review statute of policies and regulations
specifically focused on background changes, due to a changing
climate, will not become a tool for hindering individual agency
decisions. Rather, it would create a parallel process for high-level
analysis. For example, in 2010 the state of North Carolina passed a
law requiring most of its executive branch agencies to undertake an
examination of the impact of climate change on their regulations and

217. See supra Part I.
218. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(1)(B) (2012).
219. 42 U.S.C. § 7661(a)(b)(5)(B) (2012).
220. 16 U.S.C. § 1451 (2012).
221. 54 U.S.C.S. § 100101 (LexisNexis 2015).
222. 25 U.S.C. § 3001 (2012).
223. Camacho & Glicksman, supra note 132, at 713–14.
224. Id. at 817 (suggesting that in limited areas, however, such as major resource statutes,
a statute-by-statute change is feasible).
225. Similar to how the NEPA gives authority to take action to protect the environment.
See National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(A)–(B) (2012).
226. Obviously adding a “look-back” provision generally may do more harm than good.
See Thomas O. McGarity, EPA at Helm’s Deep: Surviving the Fourth Attack on Environmental
Law, 24 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 205, 240 (2013). By linking the examination of programs
to climate change, however, the law might avoid additional procedure merely for
disruption’s sake.
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programs and report the results back to the legislature. 227 Changes in
legislative governance appear to have stymied on follow-through, but
the idea is promising. Similarly, at the federal level, NEPA tasked
agencies with the requirement of examining their programs to
understand how they might impact the environment. 228 The NEPA
illustrates that such a general examination statute is possible and the
North Carolina law illustrates that it can specifically focus on climate
change. Staticism in law can thus be addressed by general
statutory mechanisms.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have a legal infrastructure based on the important legal notion
of settled doctrine. That notion, crucial to our concept of law and
justice, is becoming and will continue to become increasingly
dysfunctional as the world on which our system is based becomes less
settled. This disruption does not mean that we have to give up settled
doctrine all across the legal landscape. As noted, supra, disruption
serves important purposes. It does mean, however, that we should be
aware that it will no longer serve us in the way it should. This
recognition suggests, at the very least, that the goals of our legal
system may be better served by having options to alter “final”
decisions based on changing physical parameters.
A wholesale change would likely need to come about through a
generally applicable statute concerning the disruptive nature of climate
change. There are several examples of such laws being passed and
227. 2010 N.C. Sess. Laws 728, http://www.ncleg.net/EnactedLegislation/
SessionLawsCD/SessionLaws/2010SessionLaws.pdf (stating that the Department of
Administration, Department of Agriculture, Consumer Services, Department of Commerce,
Department of Crime Control and Public Safety, Department of Environment and Natural
Resources, etc. should review their regulatory programs to determine if they take into
consideration climate change. After doing so, they need to report back to the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources on how those programs consider climate change or, if they
do not consider climate change adequately or at all, recommend the additions and modifications
they would make.).
228. National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4333 (2012) (“All agencies of the
Federal Government shall review their present statutory authority, administrative regulations,
and current policies and procedures for the purpose of determining whether there are any
deficiencies or inconsistencies therein which prohibit full compliance with the purposes and
provisions of this chapter and shall propose to the President not later than July 1, 1971, such
measures as may be necessary to bring their authority and policies into conformity with the
intent, purposes, and procedures set forth in this chapter.”).
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proposed, 229 but the association with climate change may make this
change politically difficult. Nevertheless, a focus on the problem will
allow us to keep calling for and working on a solution. The fact that
the Coastal Zone Management Act is based so obviously on a static
view of coastal systems and areas is an egregious example of the
mismatch between our laws and our changing world, but it is not the
only such mismatch.
In his writings, the philosopher Frederick Nietzsche often
returned to the theme of change. 230 While his writings applied to why
humans anticipated the future in a certain way, he correctly noted that
human society has resisted the idea of impermanence and change.231
Such foundational social constructs also undergird our legal system.
This stability and predictability serve many important purposes in law
and society. But climate change is and will continue to make settled
legal doctrine more and more dysfunctional. While we do not have to
surrender the desire and utility for predictability and finality, we must
be aware of the impacts it will have in areas left unexamined. Much of
our legal infrastructure is built on the idea of this unshakeable and
never changing world. Where this is clearly causing harm and
inefficiency, we should not settle.

229. See, e.g., Small Business Disaster Reform Act of 2013, S. 415, 113th Cong. (2013).
230. See generally Siemens, supra note 1 (Nietzsche believed change was the key to
understanding the nature of the human condition.).
231. Id.
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